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Apprenticeship Training and the Business Cycle
* 
 
Dual apprenticeship training is a market-driven form of education at the upper secondary 
level, taking place in firms as well as in vocational schools. So far, little is known about the 
impact of the business cycle on the number of apprenticeship programs offered by firms. 
Using panel-data of Swiss cantons from 1988-2004, we find that the influence of the business 
cycle is statistically significant, but small in size. Instead, supply of apprenticeship programs 
is driven to a much greater extent by demographic change. Conversely, the number of first-
year high school students is not affected by the business cycle. We find, however, that 
enrollment increases if the population at age 16 grows, but access to high schools does not 
become more restricted in times of negative growth. 
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used in the analysis. 1 Introduction
Dual training programs, i.e. ﬁrm-based provision of training in combination with
formal education in vocational schools, can be regarded as a market-driven type of
education, since ﬁrms are free to chose whether they want to engage in training,
and because apprentices spend more than half of their time at the workplace, en-
gaged not only in training activities but also in productive work. While full-time
general education may not be expected to depend on the economic climate in the
short run, this has not necessarily to be true for ﬁrm-based training. How dual ap-
prenticeship programs might be inﬂuenced by business cycles is an important and
also policy-relevant research question for countries with a high share of dual voca-
tional education. In Switzerland, but similarly also in Germany, more than half of
each cohort of school leavers enroll in a dual apprenticeship program. Put diﬀer-
ently, more than half of a cohort’s educational outcome can potentially be aﬀected
by business cycle movements. Apprenticeship programs in Switzerland, but also in
other European countries such as Germany, Austria, Denmark or the Netherlands
are designed in a way that ﬁrms are obliged by apprenticeship contracts to provide
formal training to their apprentices at the workplace. This means that a ﬁrm is
required to make a ﬁnancial investment in their apprentices, without being able to
unilaterally terminate a training contract for several years. As a consequence, ﬁrms
might refrain from such ﬁnancial investments if the business outlook is bad.
For our empirical analysis we use data on new apprenticeship contracts in all 26
Swiss cantons from the years 1988-2004. The federalistic nature of the Swiss ed-
ucation system makes such an analysis meaningful, since the availability of alter-
natives to vocational education, i.e. full-time general education programs, but also
demographic changes, industry structure and therefore business cycles vary greatly
between diﬀerent cantons. This in turn can have an impact on the dual apprentice-
ship system, because the average ability of youth applying for apprenticeships may
be lower if general education programs were to attract the more able pupils. Mak-
ing use of the panel structure of our data, we apply ﬁrst-diﬀerences estimators
and ﬁnd that enrollment in apprenticeship programs signiﬁcantly depends on our
measures of the business cycle, the unemployment rate and the lagged change in
cantonal income growth. As expected, an increase in the unemployment rate has
a negative eﬀect on new apprenticeship contracts, whereas a change in the growth
rate cantonal income has a positive eﬀect. However, the economic signiﬁcance of
these eﬀects is rather small. Conversely, our results show that demographic ﬂuctu-
ations in the relevant cohort of school leavers at age 16 is a much more important
factor in explaining ﬂuctuations in apprenticeships. In addition, we ﬁnd that the
provision of upper secondary high school education, which grants access to uni-
versity, increases steadily during times when more young people leave compulsory
schooling, but enrollment does not become more restricted in times of negative
1population growth.
This article is organized as follows: The next section provides an overview of the
relevant literature. Section 3 outlines the functioning of the Swiss apprenticeship
system. Section 4 provides information about our data set and some descriptive
statistics. The econometric modeling is given in section 5, and section 6 presents
the results. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Related literature
The aim of this section is to provide a short summary of the relevant theoretical and
empirical literature of business cycle eﬀects on apprenticeship training. Brunello
(2009), in a recent OECD survey, provides an extensive treatment of the literature
on business cycle eﬀects on apprenticeship training and other forms of training,
hence we will focus solely on the most relevant papers for our own empirical anal-
ysis in this article.
Business cycle eﬀects on apprenticeship training may be at least twofold: On the
one hand, the ﬁrm’s demand for skilled workers is usually lower during an eco-
nomic downturn, which might go hand in hand with a reduction in the demand
for apprentices, in the case where apprenticeship programs are an integral part
of the ﬁrm’s recruitment strategy (Lindley, 1975, Merrilees, 1983, Stevens, 1994,
Brunello, 2001). A ﬁrm can ﬁnd it optimal to train apprentices if retaining former
trainees as skilled workers after completion of training is less expensive compared
to hiring skilled workers on the external labor market. Therefore, if a ﬁrm needs
less skilled workers in the short run, it could be expected that the extent of appren-
ticeship training will be reduced.1 However, since apprenticeship programs typi-
cally last between three and four years, business cycle ﬂuctuations might not have
a strong impact on the provision of training, because ﬁrms should expect that the
economy will have already recovered by the time the apprenticeship has ﬁnished.
On the other hand, business cycle ﬂuctuations can also aﬀect the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt of
using apprentices in their production processes. In times of prosperity, when the
order books are ﬁlled, there may be a lot of skilled as well as unskilled work that
can be allocated to apprentices. Given a relatively low salary of apprentices, a ﬁrm
could have an incentive to expand their training activities in the short-run due to a
production motive (Lindley, 1975). However, Merrilees (1983) argued that ﬁrms
will not adjust their demand for apprentices immediately to increase output during
an economic boom. A ﬁrm might instead prefer to switch the use of trainers from
1Itisacommon ﬁndinginmany industrializedcountries that youth unemployment increases more
compared to the other workforce during an economic downturn (Gielen, 2006), which is in support
of the hypothesis above. However, this might also be due to labor market regulations demanding
ﬁrms to apply the "last-in-ﬁrst-out" rule.
2training apprentices to productive activities in order to increase output. Further-
more, it is likely the case that apprentices are initially not very productive because
they ﬁrstneed to be trained in the relevant tasks to carry out skilled work. Summing
up, theoretical considerations imply that while there are potentially important ef-
fects of business cycles, there are also countervailing eﬀects at play which possibly
reduce the overall eﬀects of economic ﬂuctuations on the supply of apprenticeships
by ﬁrms. It is therefore an empirical matter to determine whether these eﬀects are
of economic importance both to ﬁrms and policy makers.
There are a number of empirical studies that provide some evidence that fewer new
apprenticeship positions are oﬀered during an economic downturn or if unemploy-
ment rates are high. For Switzerland, the only study so far has been carried out
by Schweri & Müller (2008), who ﬁnd a (small) positive eﬀect of average GDP
growth (previous three years) on the ﬁrm’s propensity to train and on the appren-
ticeship ratio in Switzerland. Dietrich & Gerner (2007) ﬁnd that German ﬁrms re-
act sensitively to changes in (self-reported) short-term business expectations using
(unbalanced) IAB Establishment Panel data for the periods 1993-2003; a 1%-point
increase in the ﬁrm’s expected business volume increases the ﬁrm’s growth rate of
new apprenticeships by 0.35%-points.
Forthe UK, Hart(2005) ﬁndsthat less apprenticeships have been oﬀered during the
Great Depression, however, ﬁrms seemed to lay oﬀ the relatively more expensive
journeyman earlier compared to apprentices. Merrilees (1983) found a negative re-
lationship between new apprenticeship contracts and unemployment and a positive
correlation with output for the periods 1963-1979 in the UK.
For Scandinavian countries, Askilden & Nilsen (2005) provide evidence that ap-
prenticeships decrease with (current) unemployment in Norway. For the same
country, Brunello (2009) shows the (bivariate) negative relationship of apprentices
to pupils in secondary education. In addition, Westergaard-Nielsen & Rasmussen
(1999) ﬁnd that ﬁrm’s demand for apprentices is positively related to demand for
skilled labor in Denmark, which is in line with the results above.
Business cycle eﬀects can not only inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s oﬀer of apprenticeships,
but also the quit rate of individual apprentices. Bilginsoy (2003) ﬁnds for the
United States, that apprentices are more likely to leave an apprenticeship program
if unemployment is low, since outside options increase if the labor market is tight.
However, in Switzerland, apprenticeship contracts are binding and cannot be ter-
minated unilaterally.2 Therefore, this line of argument is not of great importance
for the Swiss case. However, enrollment in apprenticeships might be lower for
school-leavers at the lower end of the ability distribution, because unskilled labor
as an outside option becomes more attractive if corresponding wages increase dur-
ing an economic boom.
2Except for special circumstances that prohibit a regular completion of the training program. In
such acase, thecantonal authoritiesmust becontacted by lawtoterminateanapprenticeship contract.
3Finally, it should be noted that the motivation for a ﬁrm to provide apprentice-
ship training may be very diﬀerent from on-the-job training of the existing skilled
workforce. Bassanini et al. (2007) show that workplace training in Europe (ex-
cluding apprenticeships) positively depends on the unemployment rate, which is
not in line with the existing empirical ﬁndings on apprenticeship training. They
interpret this result such that ﬁrms are more likely to reorganize and restructure
during slack times.3 Bassanini & Brunello (2007) ﬁnd that their measure of the
business cycle, i.e. log hours worked, is negatively related to proportion of a ﬁrm’s
employees receiving training. Yet other studies on general training ﬁnd a nega-
tive association between unemployment and training, similarly to the literature on
apprenticeship training (Majumdar, 2007). Relating these results to the case of
apprenticeship training, one should keep in mind the diﬀerent strategy of the two
training schemes. While general workplace training is aimed at updating certain
skills, the goal of apprenticeship training is to equip young adults with the nec-
essary skills to become a skilled worker in the trained occupation. Furthermore,
while workplace training usually applies to the existing workforce, the decision
to train apprentices or not involves a new hire. Hence, ﬁrms are more likely to
retrain the existing workforce and avoid ﬁring costs, as well as the costs to rehire
new workers in the next boom period.4 Therefore, it might indeed be eﬃcient for a
ﬁrm to keep their existing workforce and provide extra training if business is slow;
however, we would not expect ﬁrms to hire more apprentices during a recession.
3 The apprenticeship system in Switzerland
The apprenticeship system in Switzerland has a long tradition and has proven itself
successful in providing young people with theoretical education and practical train-
ing, such that they become productive participants in the labor market; the youth
unemployment rate in Switzerland is one of the lowest among OECD countries.
This might partly be due to the features of the Swiss apprenticeship system, which
enables a large share of young people to obtain a degree at the third level of the
International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED). Similar apprentice-
ship systems exist in Germany, Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands.5 While this
paper focuses on the duality of apprenticeship training, where apprentices have a
contract with their training ﬁrm and attend vocational school, entirely school-based
3However, they also ﬁnd that ﬁrms are less likely to provide training if the output gap of a ﬁrm is
large, i.e. output is below potential output, which is at odds with the previous result, because output
and unemployment are usually negatively related.
4Blatter et al. (2008) show that hiring costs for skilled workers in Switzerland are substantial,
averaging roughly one quarter of wage payments.
5Ryan (1998) provides an international perspective on the performance of apprenticeship systems
with respect to labor market outcomes.
4apprenticeship programs exist as well. However, dual apprenticeship programs
in Switzerland are the most widely applied approach to educating students at the
upper-secondary level. Each year, roughly 60% of a cohort of school-leavers who
pursue some kind of post-compulsory schooling enroll in a dual apprenticeship
training program, which is typically at the age of 15 or 16. School-based appren-
ticeships amount to roughly 10% of all apprenticeship contracts. There are some
235 diﬀerent training occupations to choose from, which require either two, three
or four years of training (Federal Oﬃce for Professional Education and Technol-
ogy, 2008). Before the start of training, the apprentice and the ﬁrm are obliged
to sign a binding contract, which determines the quantity and quality of training
provided by the ﬁrm, apprentice pay throughout the years of training and further
obligations between the two parties.6 Furthermore, the contract cannot be termi-
nated unilaterally by either party and ends automatically by completion of training.
This implies that a training ﬁrm has not legal possibility to keep the apprentices as a
skilled workers (at a possibly low wage) after training. Retention rates in Switzer-
land are rather low, with only somewhat more than one third of apprentices still
being employed in the training ﬁrm one year after training.
During the course of a program, an apprentice usually spends 1-2 days in a state-
organized (and ﬁnanced) vocational school, receiving general education as well
as theoretical knowledge about occupation-related issues. There are exams in the
vocational schools throughout training period, which require passing grades. In ad-
dition, there is an extensive ﬁnal exam at the end of the apprenticeship. Successful
graduates will be given a national certiﬁcate, attesting the apprentice a professional
qualiﬁcation to perform skilled work in the respective occupation. However, in ad-
dition to formal education at the vocational school, an apprentice receives further
formal training at the workplace throughout the training program. It should be
noted that training personnel in the ﬁrm needs to have successfully completed ap-
prenticeship instruction courses itself (Hoeckel et al., 2009). This in turn should
guarantee that certain quality standards for ﬁrm-based training are met. In-ﬁrm
training comes at a cost for the employer, however, in Switzerland, ﬁrms can gen-
erate a beneﬁt from the productive contribution of apprentices, which on average
outweighs the training expenditures (Wolter et al., 2006). Independently whether
a ﬁrm has to incur net costs or can generate a net beneﬁt of training, the economic
climate will inﬂuence the cost-beneﬁt ratio and thereby the probability that a ﬁrm
will oﬀer apprenticeships (Muehlemann et al., 2007).
6See Dustmann & Schönberg (2007) on the importance of the ﬁrm’s commitment to externally
validated skills standards.
54 Data
Our data set includes information about enrollment in apprenticeships and enroll-
ment in high school education at the upper secondary level, which grants access
to university, from 1988 to 2004 for all 26 cantons in Switzerland. In addition,
we also have variables related to the business cycle within each canton, i.e. the
cantonal unemployment rate and the growth rate of the cantonal income, as well as
the overall population and the population of school leavers at age 16.
The variable on new enrollment in high schools is deﬁned by the pupil’s canton of
residence, and not by the canton where the high school is situated. This is of some
importance, as not all cantons have their own high schools, yet pupils can enroll
in high schools in neighboring cantons. The deﬁnition of the cantonal income has
changed twice within our period of interest, therefore the calculated ﬁgures are
not directly comparable across the whole time period. However, since we will use
growth rates in our analysis and not income levels, this should not have asigniﬁcant
impact on our estimates.7 Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis
are provided in Table 1.
5 Econometric modeling
The absolute level a of enrollment in an education program per canton i in year t is
given by
ait = υi + x′
itβ + εit (1)
where υi isacanton-speciﬁc term measuring unobserved heterogeneity which might
be correlated with the regressors, xi and β are vectors and the error term is εit. The
regressors include business cycle variables and demographic variables as described
above.
We apply a ﬁrst-diﬀerences estimator in order to diﬀerence out any canton-speciﬁc
unobserved eﬀects. The diﬀerences in new apprenticeship contracts between pe-
riod t and period t − 1 are given by
(ait − ai,t−1) = (xit − xi,t−1)′β + (εit − εi,t−1) (2)
To obtain consistent estimates, it is required that
E[(εit − εi,t−1)|(xit − xi,t−1)] = 0 (3)
This is somewhat weaker than the strong exogeneity condition which would be
required to estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects model, where E[εit|xi1,...,xiT] = 0. We estimate
7For the two transition phases, we have imputed the national GDP growth rate as an approxima-
tion for each cantonal income growth in order to circumvent any biases that might arise due to the
change in the deﬁnition of cantonal income.
6ﬁrst-diﬀerences using FGLS, assuming that εit are i.i.d. [0,σ2
ε]. This means that
the error (εit − εi,t−1) is an MA(1) error with variance 2σ2
ε and a one-period apart
autocovariance σ2
ε for cantons i.
6 Results
This section presents results for the impact of the business cycle variables sepa-
rately on yearly changes in apprenticeship contracts, yearly changes in high school
enrollment and as well on yearly changes in the ratio of apprenticeships to high
school enrollment. Inaddition, wealso consider the eﬀectsofdemographic changes
on our variables of interest.
6.1 Business cycle eﬀects
Our results show that changes in the business cycle signiﬁcantly impact the num-
ber of apprenticeship contracts in a given year. An increase in the unemployment
rate leads to a decrease in new apprenticeship contracts (Table A2). As unemploy-
ment is inversely related to the tightness of the labor market. This result can be
interpreted such that ﬁrms are more likely to oﬀer apprenticeship programs in a
situation of a tight labor market. While the coeﬃcient is statistically highly sig-
niﬁcant, the economic impact is rather small. An decrease in the unemployment
rate of 1%-point from one year to the next leads to an increase of roughly 14 new
apprenticeship contracts in a canton on average, which is equal to an increase of
0.6%. Put diﬀerently, one standard deviation decrease in the unemployment rate
(i.e. 1.86%-points) leads to an increase in new apprenticeship contracts of roughly
1%, et vice versa.
The eﬀect of an increase in the growth rate of the (lagged) cantonal income is
positive, but only marginally signiﬁcant depending on the model speciﬁcation. The
economic magnitude of the eﬀect is, however, negligible. This is not surprising,
because we expect that the ﬁrm’s decision to oﬀer apprenticeship programs is more
closely tied to the situation on the labor market than the overall economic climate.
Enrollment in high school does not depend on the business cycle. Neither the un-
employment rate nor the growth rate incantonal income have any signiﬁcant eﬀects
(Table A3). In theory, both a negative or a positive impact of the business cycle
on high school enrollment rates are possible. The fact that high school enrollment
does not react positively to business cycles indicates that high schools apply entry
standards that are independent of the situation on the labor market. At the same
time, the results also show that in the short-run, business cycle ﬂuctuations do not
seem to aﬀect short-run public funding of high school institutions, even though
budget cuts frequently occur during recessions in other areas of public spending.
So far, we have estimated business cycle eﬀects separately for new apprenticeships
and high school enrollment. However, one could imagine that unobserved eﬀects
7inﬂuencing the decision to enroll in these programs might be correlated across
the two equations. To circumvent this (potential) problem, we also estimate the
ratio of apprenticeships to high school enrollment. The results show that this ratio,
as expected, is also negatively inﬂuenced by the unemployment rate (Table A4).
One standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate leads to a decrease of
the apprenticeships to high school enrollment ratio of roughly 2%. This result is
qualitatively comparable to the eﬀects described above.
6.2 Demographic eﬀects
The population of young people at age 16 in a given canton has a signiﬁcant and
positive eﬀect onnew apprenticeships (Table A2). Anincrease inacohort of school
leavers by 10 leads to 2.7 new apprenticeships, holding other factors constant. This
number might seem very low at ﬁrst sight, however, to give it a meaningful inter-
pretation, one has to consider that on average, only 55% of a cohort of school
leavers chooses a dual apprenticeship. Hence, training ﬁrms expand their relative
oﬀer for apprenticeships by roughly 50% for each additional school leaver.8 This
results is also of economic signiﬁcance, because demographic ﬂuctuations have
been rather strong in the past. A one standard deviation increase in the population
of 16 year old leads to an increase in apprenticeships of 32% percent. Compar-
ing this to the business cycle eﬀects above, it can be concluded that demographic
changes have a much stronger impact on new apprenticeships. Schweri & Müller
(2007) also report a substantial positive eﬀect of 16-year old on training provision
of ﬁrms in Switzerland.
In Switzerland, pupils usually have to make the decision to enroll in high school
earlier before they have to search for an apprenticeship. In many cantons, pupils
already enroll in junior high school in grade seven, which enables them to go on
to senior high school without any further examinations. Therefore, the supply of
apprentices to ﬁrms in a given year does not equal the entire population of 16-year
old who leave compulsory schooling, but instead only those who have not already
enrolled in high schools before. To test for this, we have included such a variable
in the last two model speciﬁcations in Table A2. However, the coeﬃcient is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient of the whole population of 16-year old.
In addition, we have tested for the possibility that population growth could have a
diﬀerent impact on new apprenticeships compared to a decrease in the population.
Again, the coeﬃcients of a population increase and decrease, respectively, are not
8In many years of our period of observation, the supply of school leavers has exceeded the ﬁrm’s
demand for apprentices, leaving a signiﬁcant fraction of young people without an apprenticeship.
However, such individuals often successfully enroll in an apprenticeship program in the subsequent
year. This is a further reason why ﬁrms cannot react proportionally to current changes in the popula-
tions, as there is always a supply surplus from the last period which ﬁlls part of the new apprentice-
ship positions.
8statistically diﬀerent from each other.
Changes in the population of school leavers have, overall, a lower eﬀect on high
school enrollment, which is to be expected, since on average less than 20% of each
cohort goes on to high school. An increase in the population of school leavers
by 10 leads to an increase in high school enrollment by roughly 0.45 (Table A3).
This means that compared to the average enrollment (which is equal to roughly
17% of a cohort) high schools expand by about 26%. An increase by one stan-
dard deviation leads to an increase in high school enrollment of about 20%. The
model speciﬁcations in the last two columns show that high school enrollment re-
acts diﬀerently to increases than to decreases in the population. An increase in
the population of school leavers by 10 leads to 1.09 new high school enrollments,
which is equivalent to an relative increase of about 64%. However, if the popula-
tion shrinks, high schools do not reduce enrollment rates at all. Hence, our results
suggest that high schools expand during times of a demographic boom, but that
newly acquired infrastructure will not be reduced, once it is in place.9 Finally, it
should be noted that overall population growth (all ages) has a positive eﬀect on
high school enrollment. An increase in the cantonal population by 1000 leads to an
increase in high school enrollment of 3 pupils. This is in contrast to the eﬀect on
apprenticeships, where the eﬀect is zero. However, it is in line with the ﬁnancing
of the respective education programs, since expansions in high school education
have to be entirely ﬁnanced through cantonal taxes, where apprenticeships are ad-
ditionally ﬁnanced by apprentices themselves, training ﬁrms and also partly by the
federal government.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze business cycle eﬀects on dual apprenticeship programs
in 26 Swiss cantons from 1988-2004. Using ﬁrst-diﬀerences panel estimators, we
ﬁnd that increases in the cantonal unemployment rate are negatively related to the
number of new apprenticeship contracts in a given canton; a 1%-point increase in
the unemployment rate leads to 0.6% less apprenticeship contracts in a given year.
Furthermore, lagged cantonal income growth has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect
on apprenticeship provision. These ﬁndings are in line with theories explaining
that ﬁrms are more willing to train apprentices in times of a tight labor market,
such that apprenticeship training can be regarded as a way for ﬁrms to sustain a
skilled workforce. However, the (combined) magnitude of these eﬀects is rather
9This result receives some support from the estimations in Table A4. While the coeﬃcient of
overall population growth of 16-year old is virtually zero, the coeﬃcient is positive for a population
increase, but negative for a decrease (although only the latter coeﬃcient being marginally signiﬁcant
at the 10%-level).
9small, indicating that (short-term) business cycle impacts on apprenticeship train-
ing are not the main driving force of the observed patterns in the number of yearly
apprenticeship contracts. Interpreting these results, one should keep in mind that
they are found in a country where apprenticeship training opportunities are more or
less evenly spread across all sectors of economic activity and a majority of school-
leavers apply for apprenticeship positions. Therefore, it might well be that business
cycles have a more pronounced eﬀect in countries where apprenticeship training is
concentrated in speciﬁc industries or only attracts speciﬁc parts of the ability dis-
tribution of a cohort.
Compared to the impact of business cycles on apprenticeship training, we ﬁnd ev-
idence that demographic changes in the cohort of young people at age 16 have
a much stronger (and positive) eﬀect on apprenticeship enrollment; one additional
school leaver leads a ﬁrm to increase their average demand for apprentices by 50%.
Similarly, alternative full-time education programs also react to demographic ﬂuc-
tuations, but not to business cycles. We ﬁnd that a marginal increase in the popula-
tion at age 16 leads to 0.045 new pupils enrolling in high school, which is equal to
an increase of 26% compared to the average enrollment rate of 0.17.
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11A Tables
Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Apprenticeships 2260.233 2376.531 95 10547
High school enrollment 684.057 694.948 9 2916
Unemployment rate 2.529 1.840 0.0 7.8
Cantonal income growth rate 2.919 4.614 -17.0 41.6
Population age 16 3154.830 3060.453 181 12974
Population (all ages, in ’000) 271.185 279.672 13.333 1261.810
Summary statistics correspond to averages across 26 cantons from the years 1988 - 2004.
12Table A2: Determinants of enrollment in apprenticeships
Dependent variable: ∆ Apprenticeshipst,t−1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Unemploymentt,t−1 -12.959 -16.981 -15.278 -15.042 -14.206 -14.047
(3.624) (4.127) (3.749) (3.824) (3.867) (4.018)
∆National Income Growtht−1,t−2 0.775 1.110 0.734 0.755 0.995 1.073
(0.477) (0.573) (0.522) (0.521) (0.540) (0.552)
∆ Population
Age 16


























if ∆ < 0 (0.058)
Trend 1988-1991 -19.527 -23.515 -13.684 -14.945 -15.037
(3.371) (2.861) (3.079) (3.198) (3.339)
Trend 1992-2004 -0.043 -1.751 -0.603 -0.357 -0.263
(0.951) (0.798) (0.812) (0.859) (0.905)
Constant 2.827 14.796 13.814 14.838 14.948 13.173
(2.685) (7.571) (6.462) (6.744) (6.831) (7.528)
Observations 416 416 416 416 414 416
Number of cantons 26 26 26 26 26 26
Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses.
13Table A3: Determinants of enrollment in high school
Dependent variable: ∆ High school enrollmentt,t−1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Unemploymentt,t−1 2.701 2.828 2.901 1.706 1.834
(1.934) (1.963) (1.934) (1.692) (1.531)
∆ National Income Growtht−1,t−2 0.279 0.278 0.262 0.260 0.211
(0.243) (0.245) (0.243) (0.215) (0.193)
∆ Population
Age 16






t,t−1 if ∆ > 0 0.109
(0.036)
∆ PopulationAge 16
t,t−1 if ∆ < 0 -0.015
(0.035)
Trend 0.127 -0.050 0.114 0.074
(0.319) (0.324) (0.271) (0.234)
Constant 6.376 4.170 7.075 1.227 -0.151
(1.453) (5.796) (5.858) (5.058) (4.380)
Observations 416 416 416 416 442
Number of cantons 26 26 26 26 26
Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses.
14Table A4: Apprenticeships/High school enrollment
Dep. var.: ∆ Apprenticeships/High school enrollmentt,t−1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Unemploymentt,t−1 -0.049 -0.050 -0.048 -0.050 -0.050
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
∆National Income Growtht−1,t−2 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆PopulationAge 16
t,t−1 (in ’000) -0.049 -0.093
(0.125) (0.122)
∆PopulationTotal
t,t−1 (in ’000) 0.005 0.003
(0.005) (0.004)
∆PopulationAge 16
t,t−1 if ∆ > 0 (in ’000) 0.143
(0.176)
∆PopulationAge 16
t,t−1 if ∆ < 0 (in ’000) -0.369
(0.207)
Trend 1988-1991 -0.084 -0.085 -0.093 -0.091
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Trend 1992-2004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.058 -0.023 -0.023 -0.029 -0.055
(0.016) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040)
Observations 416 416 416 416 416
Number of cantons 26 26 26 26 26
Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses.
15